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In Scope
• Real-time trajectory safety and contingency 
monitoring
• Mission planning for safety and to minimize 
impact
• Collision avoidance system requirements
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Not in Scope
• “Sense and Avoid” sensors and algorithms will 
be developed by external partners
SA/CA Issues 
Four areas of research:
– Tactical Separation Assurance Safety Systems
– Off-Nominal Procedures and Automation
– System Effects of UAS Inclusion
– Required Collision Avoidance System Performance
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Tactical SA Safety Systems
• Air traffic controllers retain their responsibility 
for Separation Assurance
• Provide additional layer of safety and 
monitoring for UAS in Tactical Separation 
Assurance timeframe
• Real-time analysis of mission safety
• Leverage NASA NextGen technologies
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•Objective SACA-1: Determine the level of safety provided by 
tactical separation assurance safety monitoring systems for UAS 
missions
–Rationale: Continuous mission-risk monitoring can provide 
equivalent levels of safety for UAS operations possibly reducing 
the burden on other safety systems
–Approach: Utilize and adapt algorithms and approaches 
developed for the NextGen Airspace Systems Program for UAS 
applications
Tactical SA Objective
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Tactical SA Deliverables
FY Deliverable To Used For
FY12 Safety data from fast-time 
simulation of UAS SA
FAA Assess the viability and efficacy 
of Tactical SA safety systems
FY13 Algorithm effectiveness and 
controller/UAS operator 
acceptance from HITL study
FAA Determine controller and 
operator acceptance of systems
FY14 Performance data of tactical 
separation assurance safety 
systems from flight test
FAA Determine efficiency under 
uncertainty
FY15 Performance data of 
algorithm as part of 
integrated system from flight 
test
FAA Determine integrated 
functionality under real 
conditions
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Tactical SA Collaboration
• Partnerships: FAA - UAS models, controller expertise, 
scenario development
• Integrated Test and Evaluation:
– Integrated Sim 1: Determine possible controller and UAS 
operator acceptance of UAS safety tools
– Integrated Flight Test 2: Evaluate operation of safety tools 
with real latencies and trajectory uncertainties
– Integrated Flight Test 3: Further evaluation of real world 
uncertainties and integration with off-nominal procedures  
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Off-Nominal Safety Assurance
• Defined by loss of communication and 
possibly other failures
• Since aircraft have no onboard pilot: 
– Aircraft may need to independently avoid other 
aircraft or regions of complex airspace
– Also, may need to select overflight areas of low 
risk to ground infrastructure
• Provide automation alternative to some 
aspects of the flight authorization process
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•Objective SACA-2: Study off-nominal procedures and automation 
to assure safety of other aircraft and infrastructure in the event of a 
UAS off-nominal event such as loss of communication
–Rationale: Off-nominal events are a barrier to UAS integration 
because there is no pilot for emergency decision making, so  
determining the appropriate procedures and automating those 
tasks will mitigate the risk of UAS operations
–Approach: Leverage the contingency management experience 
of NASA and the off-nominal procedures work of external 
partners to provide tools for UAS safety in off-nominal 
conditions
Off-Nominal SA Objective
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Off-Nominal SA Deliverables
FY Deliverable To Used For
FY12 Concept of operations for off-
nominal procedures defined
Internal Determine accepted risk mitigation 
procedures for automation
FY13 Performance of off-nominal 
procedures in fast-time 
simulations
FAA Assess automation for off-nominal 
risk mitigation
FY14 Data supporting controller 
and operator acceptability of 
from HITL assessment
FAA Determine acceptability of off-
nominal procedures for UAS 
operators and controllers
FY15 Off-nominal automation 
performance in integrated 
environment from flight test
FAA Study integrated system performance 
of off-nominal SA under real flight 
conditions
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Off-Nominal SA Collaboration
• Partnerships: DoD - off-nominal processes and 
procedures; FAA - flight authorization process
• ARRA: Contingency management ConOps
• Integrated Test and Evaluation:
– Integrated Flight Test 3: Evaluate performance and 
acceptability of off-nominal procedures and 
automation with real latency and uncertainty
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System Effects of UAS
• Often have different performance 
characteristics than manned aircraft
• Often fly different routes than manned aircraft
• Systems studies will provide:
– Mission safety assessments and risk mitigation 
tools
– Impacts of UAS operations on other NAS 
stakeholders
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•Objective SACA-3: Study the effects of inclusion of specific UAS and 
missions in the NAS to determine the probable impact of the UAS 
mission on safety and other NAS stakeholders
–Rationale: The current risks and difficulties associated with 
mixed UAS operations can be studied to determine their impact 
and develop tools and procedures to mitigate this impact 
–Approach: Use NASA airspace modeling resources to evaluate 
UAS impact and to identify risk reduction strategies for specific 
UAS missions
System Effects Objective
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System Effects Deliverables
FY Deliverable To Used For
FY11 Data quantifying impact 
of UAS and missions on 
current NAS
FAA Assess the impact unique aspects of 
UAS and missions on NAS safety and 
efficiency to help determine 
required technologies
FY13 Data from analysis of 
safety and risk for specific 
UAS
FAA Help determine the safety risks in 
terms of aircraft and infrastructure 
of a UAS mission
FY15 Mission planning tool to 
minimize UAS risk and 
enable contingency 
management
FAA, UAS 
operators
Allows for UAS mission planning to 
minimize NAS impact while 
maintaining mission goals
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System Effects Collaboration
• Partnerships: FAA - Collaboration and sharing 
of fast-time modeling results and scenario 
development
• Scenario and model sharing with 
Communications simulation effort
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Collision Avoidance Requirements
• Focus on system performance requirements 
instead of component design
• Generate data to determine the required 
performance of a CA system
• Different requirements may be necessary for 
different UAS classes and missions
16
•Objective SACA-4: Provide data supporting possible requirements 
for the performance of collision avoidance systems for specific UAS 
and situations
–Rationale: There are many collision avoidance algorithms and 
sensors under development, but no functional requirements to 
verify system performance
–Approach: Generate data on collision avoidance performance 
requirements using simulation expertise 
CA Objective
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CA Deliverables
FY Deliverable To Used For
FY12 Survey of current systems 
CA systems and 
requirements used
Internal Inform future research into CA 
requirements of current system 
performance
FY12 Assessment of previous CA 
requirement specification 
methodologies
Internal Inform methodologies for 
determining required 
performance
FY14 Data from simulations to 
determine CA performance 
requirements  
FAA Large scale assessment of 
different UAS collision risks and 
performance characteristics
FY15 Candidate CA system 
requirements from 
compiled safety data from 
simulations
FAA Provide a design standard for CA 
system performance
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CA Collaboration
• Partnerships: FAA - Collaborate on desired 
data for analyses and requirement generation; 
DoD - Input on sense and avoid systems and 
performance
• ARRA: Survey of “Sense and Avoid” 
capabilities
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Facilities
• Air Traffic Control Lab – Ames
• Air Traffic Operations Lab - Langley
• Airspace Operations Lab - Ames
• IDEAS Lab – Langley
• Small UAS aircraft and operations labs – Ames, 
Langley, Dryden
• Manned surrogate UAS – Langley
• Ikhana MQ-9 - Dryden
